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Ten Years of Basic Law Amendments:
Developing a Constitutional Model of
German Unification
ABSTRACT

On October 3, 1990, West and East Germany officially
united. Although several unification methods were possible, the
unification occurred by East Germany acceding to the West
German Constitution-the Basic Law-through a series of
treaties. This "treaty route" to unification necessarily required
amendments to the Basic Law.
The primary unification instrument, the Treaty on the
Establishment of German Unity, detailed the Basic Law
amendments that were immediately essential to effectuating
unification. The treaty, however, also contemplated additional
Basic Law amendments arising from the consequences of
unification. In fact, in the ten years following German
unification, the German legislature passed six Basic Law
amendments that directly addressed unification issues.
This Note analyzes the unification amendments to the
Basic Law, identifying both the positive and the negative
constitutionaleffects of German unification. The Note organizes
these constitutional effects into a Constitutional Model of
German Unification. The Constitutional Model of German
Unification: (1) identifies and explains the constitutional
characteristics of unification, (2) proposes constitutional
recommendationsfor future unifying States, and (3) predicts the
content of future unification amendments to the Basic Law.
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I. INTRODUCTION1

On October 3, 1990, West and East Germany officially united to
form a single, enlarged Federal Republic of Germany. 2
The
unification occurred in accordance with the Treaty on the
Establishment of German Unity (Unification Treaty) of August 31,
1990. 3 The treaty route to German unification 4 had been strongly
endorsed by the East German elections of March 18, 1990. 5 In fact,
the Unification Treaty itself was only one of several agreements that

1.

Unless otherwise noted, the Basic Law provisions cited in this Note are

available in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD (Albert P. Blaustein &

Gisbert H. Flanz, eds., Supp. 8/91, 3194, & 8/94); (Gisbert H. Flanz. ed., Supp. 6195 &
6/99) [hereinafter CONSTITUTIONS]. The English translations of the Basic Law are also
provided by this source, unless otherwise noted.
2.
KONRAD H. JARAUSCH, THE RUSH TO GERMAN UNITY 177-78 (1994).
3.
Treaty on the Establishment of German Unity, August 31, 1990, F.R.G.G.D.R., 30 I.L.M. 457 (1991) [hereinafter Unification Treaty].
4.
See infra Part II.C.
5.
GERT-JOACHIM GLAESSNER, THE UNIFICATION PROCESS IN GERMANY 75
(Colin B. Grant trans., 1992).

636

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL

LAW

[VOL. 34:633

was necessary to realize German unification. 6
The Treaty
7
Establishing a Monetary, Economic and Social Union (May 18, 1990)
and the Treaty on the Final Settlement With Respect to Germany
(September 12, 1990)8 also contributed significantly to the unification
process.
During and following the 1990 unification Germany
amended its Constitution or Grundgesetz (Basic Law) 9 thirteen times,
affecting forty different articles of that document. 10 The Basic Law
had been amended thirty-five times between its original
promulgation on May 23, 1949, and German unification in 1990.11
This Note will develop a Constitutional Model of German
Unification by analyzing the Basic Law amendments that occurred as
a result of German unification. The constitutional model will identify
and explain the implications of the unique positive and negative
constitutional characteristics of German unification.
The
development of a Constitutional Model of German Unification is
important for three reasons: (1) to provide an analytical framework
within which future unifying States may evaluate and implement
their own unification; (2) to propose a set of constitutional
recommendations for future unifying States based on Germany's
unification experience; and (3) to predict the content of future Basic
Law amendments relating to unification.
Section II will describe the processes by which Germany amends
the Basic Law and enters into treaties. This section will also explain
the constitutional authority under which Germany entered into the
unification process. Next, Section II will detail the constitutionally
significant provisions of the Unification Treaty and the Treaty
Establishing a Monetary, Economic, and Social Union (MESU
Treaty).12 Finally, this section will briefly describe the content of
each of the thirteen Basic Law amendments since 1990.

6.

See generally KONRAD H. JARAUSCH

& VOLKER GRANSOW,

UNITING

GERMANY: DOCUMENTS AND DEBATES 1944-1993 (1994).
7.
Treaty Establishing a Monetary, Economic and Social Union, May 18, 1990,
F.R.G.-G.D.R., 29 I.L.M. 1108 (1990) [hereinafter MESU Treaty].
8.
Treaty on the Final Settlement With Respect to Germany, Sept. 12, 1990,
29 I.L.M. 1186 (1990). The World War II victors-the United States, the United
Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and France-and West and East Germany concluded this
treaty to establish the international conditions under which Germany could unite and
to return to Germany its full sovereignty for the first time since World War II. Id. arts.

1-7.
9.
The Basic Law was so named in 1949 to reflect West Germany's goal of
future reunification. Edward M. Andries, On the German Constitution's Fiftieth
Anniversary: Jacques Maritain and the 1949 Basic Law (Grundgesetz), 13 EMORY INT L
L. REv. 1, 33 (1999). It was intended "to be a temporary framework for a now
democratic system, not a definitive constitution." Id.
10.
See infra Part III.
11.
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 1, at v (Supp. 8/91).
12.
The Unification Treaty and the MESU Treaty were the only two unification
treaties to which West and East Germany constituted the only two parties. The Treaty
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Section III will: (1) identify the Basic Law amendments that
resulted from unification; (2) detail the provisions of each
amendment; (3) explain how each amendment relates to unification;
and (4) describe how each amendment contributes to the
Constitutional Model of German Unification.
Section IV will define the Constitutional Model of German
Unification by:
(1) identifying and explaining the seven
constitutional characteristics of German unification; (2) proposing
constitutional recommendations for future unifying States in light of
Germany's unification experience; and (3) predicting the content of
future Basic Law amendments relating to unification.

II. AMENDING THE BASIC LAW AND CONCLUDING
TREATIES: PROCESS AND SUBSTANCE
A discussion of the constitutional effects of German unification
necessarily implicates two different procedures that vill be discussed
in this section: the passage of constitutional amendments and the
conclusion of treaties. These two processes can be closely related; in
fact, a constitutional amendment may be necessary to authorize
participation in or fulfillment of a treaty. This raises two additional
issues that will be discussed in this section:
the sources of
constitutional authority for Germany's participation in the unification
process, as well as the identification of the essential provisions of the
two unification treaties. This section will conclude by briefly
describing the content of the Basic Law amendments since 1990.
A. Amending the Basic Law
The legislative branch of the Federal Government is composed of
two houses: the Bundestag (Federal Parliament) and the Bundesrat
(Federal Council).13 The Bundestag is a parliamentary assembly that
represents the people of Germany. 14 The two major functions of this
lower house are "to pass laws [and] to elect the Federal Chancellor."1 5
The Bundesrat, on the other hand, is composed of Land (state)

on the Final Settlement With Respect to Germany and other agreements, all involved
other parties (typically the World War II victors) and involved completely different sets
of obligations. See Treaty on the Final Settlement With Respect to Germany, supra
note 8. The Unification Treaty and the MESU Treaty, therefore, are the most useful
sources with which to analyze the constitutional obligations and goals of the united
Germany.
13.
SOCIErATS-VERLAG, FACTS ABOUT GERMANY 122 (1992).

14.
15.

Id. at 126.
Id.
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representatives who are not elected by the people. 16 The consent of
the Bundesrat for regular legislation is only required if the legislation
concerns the "vital interests of the17 states" because Bundesrat
members represent the Ldnder (states).
In accordance with Article 79(2) of the Basic Law, however, both
houses of the legislature must approve an amendment to the Basic
Law.' 8
An amendment must be passed "by two-thirds of the
Members of the Bundestag and two-thirds of the votes of the
Bundesrat."'19
The constitutional amendment must also be
"explicit."20
B. Concluding Treaties
21
Article 32 of the Basic Law governs the treaty-making power.
Article 32 not only allows the Federal Government to conclude
treaties, but it also defines situations in which the Ldnder may
conclude treaties with foreign states. 22 Both the unification treaties
involve the Federal Government's treaty-making power so only the
federal treaty-making power will be described in this Note.
Generally speaking, the Federal Government may conclude
treaties involving three types of subjects: subjects over which it has
exclusive legislative authority under Article 73 of the Basic Law,
subjects over which it has concurrent legislative authority with the
Ldnder, and subjects over which it has the power to enact general
rules. 23 There is unresolved debate as to whether the Federal
Government may conclude treaties in areas exclusively legislated by
the Lander.24
A non-binding agreement between the Federal
Government and the Lander (referred to as the "Lindau
Arrangement" of November 14, 1957), however, recognizes the
practicality of allowing the Federal Government to conclude treaties
that may incidentally affect issues of exclusive Lander legislative
25
authority.

16.
Id. at 128.
17.
Id. The Bundesrat, however, reserves the right to object to legislation
passed by the Bundestag. Id. The Bundestagcan override a Bundesrat objection. Id.
18.
GRUNDGESETZ [Constitution] [hereinafter GG] art. 79(2) (F.R.G.), reprinted
in CONSTITUTION, supra note 1.
19.
Id. (italics added).
20.
DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF
GERMANY 26 (1994); see also GG, supranote 18, art. 79(1).
21.
GG, supra note 18, art. 32.
22.

Id.

23.
Torsten Stein, Conclusion and Implementation of Treaties in the Federal
Republic of Germany, in REPORTS ON GERMAN PUBLIC LAW 43, 47-49 (Rudolf Bernhardt
& Ulrich Beyerlin eds., 1990).
24.
Id. at 50-51.
25.
Id. at 51-52.
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The subject matter of a treaty determines whether the legislative
branch must approve it.26 The consent of the Bundestag (and
perhaps of the Bundesrat) is required under Article 59(2) of the Basic
Law for "[t]reaties which regulate the political relations of the
Federation or relate to matters of federal legislation."" 7 If consent of
the legislative branch is required, the consent must be conveyed in
the form of a federal statute. 26 The Basic Law does not require more
than a simple majority to consent to a treaty, unless the resulting
statute would amend the Basic Law.29 As is the case with other
federal legislation,3" the subject matter of a treaty governs whether
31
the Bundesrat must join the Bundestag in consenting to a treaty.

Therefore, the subject matter of a treaty resolves two issues: (1)
whether the legislative branch must approve the treaty at all; and (2)
if consent is required, whether the Bundesrat must be included in the
approval process.

32

C. Sources of ConstitutionalAuthority for German Unification
There is broad consensus that the constitutional authority for
German unification could have derived from either Article 23 or
Article 146 of the Basic Law. 33 At the time of its adoption, Article 23
provided for the possibility of a future German unification. 34 Article
146, on the other hand, indicated that a new constitution could be
drafted should unification ever be considered.3 5 The unification

26.
GG, supra note 18, art. 59(2).
27.
Id.
28.
Id.
29.
Id. arts. 59(2), 79(2).
30.
See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
31.
See GG, supra note 18, art. 59(2).
32.
Id.
Report on the Situation in the German Democratic Republic, Eur. Consult.
33.
Ass., 42nd Sass., Doe. No. 6219 (1990); CURRIE, supra note 20, at 88-89; PETER E.
CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES OF GER.MAN
QUINT, THE IMPERFECT UNION:
UNIFICATION 48-53 (1997); Albrecht Randelzhofer, German Unification: Constitutional
and InternationalImplications, 13 MICH. J. INTVL L. 122, 123-24 (1991); Paul M.
Schwartz, Constitutional Change and Constitutional Legitimation The Example of
German Unification, 31 HOUS. L. REV. 1027, 1080-82 (1994).
34.
"For the time being, this Basic Law shall apply in the territory of the
Lander of Baden, Bavaria, Bremen, Greater Berlin, Hamburg, Hesse, Lower-Saxony,
North-RhinelWestphalia, Rhineland-Palatinate, Schleswig.Holstein, WurttembergBaden, and Wiirttemberg-Hohenzollern. In other parts of Germany it shall be put into
force on their accession." GG, supranote 18, art. 23 (F.R.G.) (repealed 1990). available
in THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GEIMANY 237 (Ulrich Karpen. ed.,
1988) (italics added).
35.
'This Basic Law shall cease to be in force on the day in which a constitution
adopted by a free decision of the German people comes into force." GG, supra note 18.
art. 146 (F.R.G.) (amended 1990), available in THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL
REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, supranote 34, at 306.

640

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL

LAW

IVOL. 34:633

proceeded under Article 23 because the Article did not require a
lengthy constitutional convention to achieve unification (as Article
36
146 seemed to require).
Article 23 and Article 146 were not the only proposed methods
for instituting German unification. 37 "Confederation" was another
possible route to unification under the 1990 Basic Law. 38

This

unification method allowed both German States to "preserve their
individual structures and governments while gradually merging some
Chancellor Helmut Kohl supported this
specified functions." 39
method in his Ten-Point Plan of November 28, 1989.40 A lack of
this option and Chancellor Kohl soon
political support defeated
41
withdrew his proposal.
Hans Modrow, the East German Prime Minister, suggested
42
another early proposal for unification that enjoyed initial support.
Modrow proposed a "contractual community" between West and East
Germany. 43 This idea, like Chancellor Kohls confederation44proposal,
was eventually abandoned due to a lack of political support.
D. Provisionsof the Two UnificationTreaties
This section will identify provisions of the Unification Treaty and
the MESU Treaty that were most likely to produce amendments to
the Basic Law, even if they have not done so yet. This is important
because these treaties delineated the nature of the proposed
relationship between West and East Germany. As such, these treaty

CURRIE, supra note 20, at 88. Article 23 was also chosen, instead of Article
36.
146, because of the potential for "uncertainty and delay." Id. A constitutional
convention would have also risked weakening the constitution's "desirable features."
Id.
37.
Report on the Situation in the German Democratic Republic, supra note 33,
at 14; QUINT, supra note 33, at 47-48.
38. QUINT, supra note 33, at 47-48.
39.
Id. at 47.
Id. The Ten-Point Plan, which was presented to the Bundestag, proposed
40.
an agreement between West and East Germany that would have eventually grown into
a federation, but only after the German Democratic Republic had instituted a
"democratically elected government" Report on the Situation in the German
DemocraticRepublic, supra note 33, at 14.
41.
QUINT, supra note 33, at 48. This lack of political support was evidenced by
the overwhelming defeat of the proposal by the East German voters in the election of
March 18, 1990. Id.
42.

STEPHEN F. SZABO, THE DIPLOMACY OF GERMAN UNIFICATION 21, 26 (1992).

Modrow assumed the position of Prime Minister in October 1989 after Erich Honecker
stepped down as General Secretary of East Germany's Communist Party. Id. at 20, 36.
Report on the Situation in the German Democratic Republic, supra note 33,
43.
at 14.
44.
Id. at 15. Unlike Kohl's plan that was soundly defeated by the East
German vote in March 1990 Modrow's plan suffered a "virtually universal refusal from
West German political society." Id.
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provisions either required Basic Law amendment, recommended
Basic Law amendment, or foreshadowed Basic Law amendment. A
Constitutional Model of German Unification must consider the
original intentions of West and East Germany as stated in the two
unification treaties. Provisions of the Unification Treaty will be
detailed first, despite chronology, because it was the primary
instrument in structuring the unification process.
1. The Unification Treaty of August 31, 1990
Article 4 of the Unification Treaty detailed the required
"Amendments to the Basic Law Resulting from Accession." 45 Treaty
47
Article 4(1) provided the updated text 46 of the Basic Law Preamble.
Treaty Article 4(2) required that Basic Law Article 2348 be repealed. 49
Treaty Article 4(3) mandated that a phrase 50 be added to Article 51(2)
of the Basic Law. 5 1 Treaty Article 4(4) required a new Basic Law
53
Article 135a(2) 52 dealing with the former East Germany's debt.
Treaty Article 4(5) mandated a new Basic Law Article 143,54 dealing
with transition periods for discrepancies between old East German
law and the Basic Law.5 5 Finally, treaty Article 4(6) provided the
updated text 56 for Basic Law Article 146.57 The Thirty-Sixth
Amendment of September 23, 1990, amended the Basic Law exactly
as required by Article 4 of the Unification Treaty. 58

Unification Treaty, supra note 3, art. 4. A constitutional challenge alleged
45.
that Basic Law amendments could not be passed if their passage could only be
effectuated by assenting to a treaty. BVerfGE 82, 316, (316) (an English translation of
the holding is available at http:/vwwv.virtual.institute.detenfr8693/er8693_208.cfm.
The Federal Constitutional Court rejected the challenge, holding that the "treaty
route" to German unification "has its constitutional basis in Art. 23 clause 2 of the
Basic Law in conjunction with the reunification directive of the Basic Law." Id.
46.
See infra note 110 and accompanying text.
47.
Unification Treaty, supra note 3, art. 4(1).
48.
See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
49.
Unification Treaty, supra note 3, art. 4(2)
50.
See infra note 113 and accompanying text.
51.
Unification Treaty, supranote 3, art. 4(3).
52.
See infra note 114 and accompanying text.
53.
Unification Treaty, supra note 3, art. 4(4).
54.
See infra notes 115-16 and accompanying text.
55.
Unification Treaty, supra note 3, art. 4(5). A constitutional challenge was
filed claiming that Article 143 as contained in Article 4(5) of the Unification Treaty,
was unconstitutional under Article 79(3) of the Basic Law: "Amendments of this Basic
Law affecting the division of the Federation into Laender, the participation on principle
of the Laender in legislation; or the basic principles laid down in Articles 1 and 20 shall
be inadmissible." GG, supra note 18, art. 79(3). BVerfGE 84, 90 (90). The Federal
Constitutional Court rejected the challenge. See id. at 94, 90 (90).
56.
See infra note 119 and accompanying text.
57.
Unification Treaty, supra note 3, art. 4(6).
58.
See infra Part iIA.
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Article 5 of the Unification Treaty recommended that the united
German legislature consider "within two years" whether further
Basic Law amendments would be necessary "in connection with
German unification." 59 The treaty specifically recommended that
four areas be considered for possible amendment: "the relationship
between the Federation and the Linder . . . , [the] restructuring [of]
the Berlin/Brandenburg area . . . , [the introduction of] state
objectives into the Basic Law, and ...the question of applying Article
60
146 of the Basic Law and of holding a referendum in this context."
This treaty recommendation contributed to the passage of the Thirty61
Seventh, Thirty-Eighth, and Forty-Second Amendments.
Article 25 of the Unification Treaty charged the Trust Agency
"with restructuring and privatizing the former publicly owned
enterprises to bring them into line with the requirements of a
competitive economy." 62 At its conception in March 1990, however,
the Trust Agency was intended to "preserve the 'peoples' property'
rather than to reorganize or privatize it. '63 Article 25 of the
Unification Treaty may have contemplated the privatization of East
German enterprises but the Fortieth Amendment of December 20,
64
1993, privatized the railroads for all of Germany.
Article 31(1) of the Unification Treaty assigned the task of
"develop[ing] further the legislation on equal rights for men and
women" to the united German legislature. 65 This provision, in
conjunction with Treaty Article 5, contributed to changing Article 3 of
the Basic Law under the Forty-Second Amendment of October 27,
1994.66

Article 34(1) of the Unification Treaty declared that "it shall be
the task of the legislators to protect the natural basis of man's
existence, with due regard for prevention, the polluter-pays principle,
and cooperation, and to promote uniform ecological conditions of a
high standard at least equivalent to that reached in the Federal
Republic of Germany. '67 This provision, in conjunction with Treaty
Article 5, contributed to the insertion of Article 20a into the Basic
8
Law under the Forty-Second Amendment of October 27, 1994.6

59.
60.
61.
62.

Unification Treaty, supra note 3, art. 5.
Id.
See infra Parts III.B., III.C., and III.F.
Unification Treaty, supra note 3, art. 25(1).

63.

PETER H. MERKL, GERMAN UNIFICATION IN THE EUROPEAN CONTEXT 275

(1993).
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

See infra Part III.E.
Unification Treaty, supranote 3, art.
See infra note 274 and accompanying
Unification Treaty, supranote 3, art.
See infra note 275 and accompanying

31(1).
text.
34(1).
text.
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A pervasive feature of the Unification Treaty is the concept of
"transition periods," or established periods during which eastern
German law may deviate from the Basic Law or established periods
during which the united German law may apply differently to
western Germans and to eastern Germans. Treaty Article 4(5) which
required a new Basic Law Article 14369 is an example of a transition
period for deviations between eastern German law and the Basic
Law. 70 Treaty Article 30(2) which allowed eastern Germans to
receive earlier retirement payments than western Germans for a
defined period, is an example of a transition period for deviations in
the applicability of the law. 7 1 The significance of transition periods
72
will resurface in the Constitutional Model of German Unification.
2. The Monetary, Economic, and Social Union Treaty of May 18, 1990
Article 16 of the MESU Treaty is entitled 'Trotection of the
Environment."73 This article is significant in three ways. First,
Treaty Article 16(1) declared that "[t]he protection of human beings,
animals and plants, soil, water, air, the climate and landscapes as
well as the cultural and other material property against harmful
environmental influences is a major objective .... "4 Furthermore,
Treaty Article 16(1) resolved that the "aim [of West and East
Germany] is the rapid establishment of a German environmental
Finally, Treaty Article 16(4) determined that "the
union."75
environmental requirements of [West and East Germany] shall be
76
harmonized and developed at a high level as quickly as possible."
Article 20a under
Treaty Article 16 aided in the addition of Basic Law
77
the Forty-Second Amendment of October 27, 1994.
The 'Trotocol on Guidelines," supplementing the MESU Treaty,
provided guidelines for the economic union of West and East
Most importantly for this Note, paragraph seven
Germany. 78
accounted for the privatization of public enterprises. 79 "Enterprises
under direct -or indirect state ownership . . . will be organized
competitively as quickly as possible and transferred to private

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

See infra note 116 and accompanying text.
Unification Treaty, supra note 3, art. 4(5).
Id. art. 30(2).
See infra notes 319-20 and accompanying text.
MESU Treaty, supranote 7, art. 16.
Id. art. 16(1).
Id.
Id. art. 16(4).
See infra note 275 and accompanying text.
MESU Treaty, supranote 7, Protocol on Guidelines A.11.
Id.
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ownership as far as possible." 80 This provision contributed to the
passage of the Fortieth Amendment of December 20, 1993, dealing
81
with the privatization of the railroads.
E. Identificationof the Basic Law Amendments Since 1990
The purpose of this section is to briefly identify and describe the
Basic Law amendments since 1990. Not every Basic Law amendment
since 1990 fulfilled a unification obligation or resulted from the
consequences of the unification process. Nevertheless, there are two
reasons for including a short description of every Basic Law
amendment since 1990 at this stage. First, because most Basic Law
amendments are considered routine and ordinary, they can be
difficult to research. One objective of this Note is to facilitate future
research involving these amendments by providing the date, general
subject matter, and citation of each amendment. Second, if only
selected amendments were listed, it would be difficult to challenge
the forthcoming analysis. It is another objective of this Note to
encourage future debate and discussion regarding these amendments,
and a complete list of the amendments is necessary to do so.
The Thirty-Sixth Amendment of September 23, 1990, enacted
the six changes to the Basic Law that were mandated by Article 4 of
the Unification Treaty. 82
The Thirty-Seventh Amendment of July 14, 1992, added a second
sentence to Article 87d(1) of the Basic Law. 83 This change authorized
the Federal Government to determine "[t]he question of public or
84
private status" for air transport.
The Thirty-Eighth Amendment of December 21, 1992, made
eight changes to the Basic Law affecting Articles 23, 24(la), 28(1), 45,
50, 52(3a), 88, and 115e(2). 85 This Amendment not only provided
Germany with the constitutional authority to enter the Treaty on
European Union,8 6 but it also updated the Basic Law to refer to
87
Germany's participation in the European Union.

80.
Id.
See infra note 221 and accompanying text.
81.
82.
BGB1. II S. 885, http://www.bgbl.makrolog.de; see also CONSTITUTIONS,
supra note 1, at 80, 91, 102, 158, 160, 161 (Aug. 1991) (discussing the changes under
the Thirty-Sixth Amendment in English); Unification Treaty, supra note 3, art. 4.
83.
BGBI. I S. 1254, supra note 82; see also CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 1, at vii
(Mar. 1994) (discussing the change under the Thirty-Seventh Amendment in English).
84.
GG, supra note 18, art. 87d(1) (F.R.G.).
85.
BGBI. I S. 2086, http://www.virtual-institute.de/de/r8693/r8693_230.cfm;
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 1, at viii (Mar. 1994) (discussing the changes under the
Thirty-Eighth Amendment in English).
86.
Treaty on European Union and Final Act, Feb. 7, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 247
(1992).
87.
See infra Part III.C.1.

20011

CONSTITUTIONAL MODEL OF GERMAN UNIFICIATION

645

The Thirty-Ninth Amendment of June 28, 1993, dealt with Basic
Law Articles 16(2), 16a, and 18.88 This amendment created stricter
requirements for political asylum.8 9
The Fortieth Amendment of December 20, 1993, made eight
changes to the Basic Law affecting Articles 73(6), 73(6a), 74(23),
80(2), 87(1), 87e, 106a, and 143a.9 0 These changes dealt entirely with
federal railroad issues; most importantly, they effected the
privatization of the federal railroads. 9 1
The Forty-First Amendment of August 30, 1994, inserted two
new articles into the Basic Law: Article 87f (dealing with postal
affairs and telecommunications) and Article 143b (dealing with the
German Postal Service). 92 Furthermore, this Amendment changed
93
existing Articles 73(7), 80(2), and 87(1).
The Forty-Second Amendment of October 27, 1994, made
multiple changes to the Basic Law affecting Articles 3, 28, 29, 72, 74,
75, 76, 77, 80, 87, and 93.94 The Amendment also added new Basic
Law Articles 20a, 118a, and 125a. 95 Most significantly for this Note,
Article 3 provided for gender equality and constitutional protections
for the disabled. 96 Furthermore, Article 20a inserted constitutional
97
protections for the environment.
The Forty-Third Amendment of November 3, 1995, amended the
third and fourth paragraphs of Article 106.98 Article 106 deals with
the apportionment of tax revenue, and it 'Isamong the frequently
amended articles of the Basic Law."99
The Forty-Fourth Amendment of October 20, 1997, revisited
Articles 28(2) and 106.100 The fifth and sixth sentences of Article

88.
See BGB1. I S. 1002, supra note 82; CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 1,at viii-ix
(Mar. 1994) (discussing the changes under the Thirty-Ninth Amendment in English).
89.
See infra Part III.D.1.
90.
See BGB1. I S. 2089, supra note 82; CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 1, at vii-ix
(Aug. 1994) (discussing the changes under the Fortieth Amendment in English).
91.
See infra Part 1IH.E.1.
92.
See BGBI. I S. 2245, supra note 82; CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 1, at ix-x
(June 1995) (discussing the changes under the Forty-First Amendment in English).
93.
See id.
94.
See BGB1. I S. 3146, supra note 82; CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 1, at x-.xvi
(June 1995) (discussing the changes under the Forty-Second Amendment in English).

95.

Id.

96.
See infra notes 229-30 and accompanying text.
97.
See infra notes 231-32 and accompanying text.
98.
BGB1. I S. 1492, supra note 82; CONSTITUTIONS. supra note I. at 1-3 (June
1999) (discussing the changes under the Forty-Third Amendment in English).
99.
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 1, at 1 (June 1999); see GG. supra note 18, art,
106 (F.R.G.).
100. BGB1. I S. 2470, supra note 82; CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 1, at 1-2, 3-4
(June 1999) (discussing the changes under the Forty-Fourth Amendment in English).
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28(2) were amended, and three paragraphs-(5a), (6), and (7)-were
added to Article 106.101

The Forty-Fifth Amendment of March 26, 1998, outlined the
conditions under which "technical means" may be employed to
monitor residences.' 0 2 This Amendment added new Articles 13(3),
13(4), 13(5), and 13(6) to the Basic Law, while the old Article 13(3)
1
became the new Article 13(7). 03
The Forty-Sixth Amendment of July 16, 1998, resulted in a
minor change to Article 39(1) of the Basic Law.10 4 Article 39 governs
10 5
Bundestag elections.
The Forty-Seventh Amendment of November 29, 2000, provided
the circumstances under which a German citizen may be extradited
10 6
under Article 16(2) of the Basic Law.
The Forty-Eighth Amendment of December 19, 2000, changed
the second sentence of Article 12a(4) to allow women to choose to
07
serve in armed military combat.'

III. BASIC LAW AMENDMENTS RESULTING FROM UNIFICATION:
IDENTIFICATION AND ANALYSIS

This section will: (1) identify the Basic Law amendments that
resulted from unification; (2) detail the provisions of each
amendment; (3) explain how each amendment relates to unification;
and (4) describe how each amendment contributes to the
Constitutional Model of German Unification.
A. Thirty-Sixth Amendment of September 23, 1990108
1. Amendment Provisions
This Amendment, which instituted the German unification
provisions, resulted in six changes to the Basic Law. The first change

101.
See id.
102.
See BGBl. I S. 610, http://www.bundesanzeiger.de/bgbllf/findex98.htm;
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 1, at 3 (June 1999) (discussing the changes under the
Forty-Fith Amendment in English).
103.
Id.
104.

BGBl. I S. 1822, supra note 102. CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 1, at 4 (June

1999) (discussing the change under the Forty-Sixth Amendment in English).
105.
GG, supranote 18, art. 39 (F.R.G.).
106.
BGB1. I S. 1633, http://www.bundesanzeiger.de/bgbllf/findexO0.htm
(translated by author).
107.
"Sie dUrfen auf keinen Fall zum Dienst mit der Waffe verpflichtet werden."
BGB1. I S. 1755, supranote 106 (translated by author).
108.
See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
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recognized the unification of Germany in a new Preamble. 1
reads:

9
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It now

Conscious of their responsibility before God and humankind,
Animated by the resolve to serve world peace as an equal part of a
united Europe, The German people have adopted, by virtue of their
constituent power, this Basic Law.
'The Germans in the Lander of Baden-WOirttemberg, Bavaria, Berlin,
Brandenburg, Bremen, Hamburg, Hesse, Lower Saxony, MecklenburgWestern Pomerania, North-RhinelWestphalia, Rhineland-Palatinate,
Saarland, Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt, Schleswig-Holstein and Thuringia
have achieved the unity and freedom of Germany in free selfdetermination. This Basic Law is valid for the entire German
11 0
people.

The second change to the Basic Law under the Thirty-Sixth
Amendment was the removal of Article 23, the authority of which had
allowed the German unification process to occur.1 11 Therefore, no
Article 23 existed until the Thirty-Eighth Amendment of December
21, 1992, which inserted a new Article 23.112
The third change to the Basic Law under this Amendment
involved Article 51(2). The change added the words "and Ldinder with
more than seven million inhabitants six votes" to the existing words
of "[e]ach Land shall have at least three votes; Linder with more
than two million inhabitants shall have four, Ltdnder with more than

six million inhabitants five.

...

.,113

The fourth change added all of the language of Article 135a(2).

Article 135a deals with "Old Liabilities," and the addition of Article

109.

Prior to the Thirty-Sixth Amendment, the Preamble had stated:

The German people in the Lander of Baden, Bavaria, Bremen, Hamburg,
Hesse, Lower Saxony, North-RhinelWestphalia, Rhineland-Palatinate,
Schleswig-Holstein, Wfirttemberg-Baden and Wfirttemberg.Hohenzollern,
Conscious of their responsibility before God and men, Animated by the resolve
to preserve their national and political unity and to serve the peace of the world
as an equal partner in a united Europe, Desiring to give a new order to political
life for a transitional period, Have enacted, by virtue of their constituent power.
this Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany. They have also acted on
behalf of those Germans to whom participation was denied. The entire German
people are called upon to achieve in free self-determination the unity and
freedom of Germany.
GG, supranote 18, preamble (F.R.G.) (amended 1990), available in THE CONSTIMTMfrON
OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIc OF GERMANY, supra note 34, at 226.
110.
GG, supranote 18, preamble (F.R.G.).
111.
See infra Part 1.C.
112.
See infra notes 141-47 and accompanying text.
113.
GG, supra note 18, art. 51(2) (F.R.G.) (italics added); id. art. 51(2) (F.R.G.)
(amended 1990) (italics added).
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135a(2) has the effect of including the former East Germany's old
4
liabilities under this provision."
The fifth change to the Basic Law under the Thirty-Sixth

Amendment inserted a new Article 143. Article 143 accounts for the
legal transition of eastern Germany by providing time limits for when

former East German law must conform to the Basic Law."

5

Article

143(1) now reads:
(1)

Law in the territory specified in Article 3 of the Unification
Treaty may derogate from provisions of this Basic Law for a
period not extending beyond 31 December 1992 in so far and as
long as it is not possible for that territory to comply fully with
the requirements of the Basic Law on account of different
conditions existing there.
Derogations must not violate
paragraph (2) of Article 19 and must be compatible with the
principles set out in paragraph (3) of Article 79.116

As promulgated in May 1949 the original Article 143 provided for the

criminal punishment of any person who acted against Germany, its
Linder,or its Federal President."

7

Finally, the sixth change under the Thirty-Sixth Amendment
replaced the old text of Article 146 with new text. Whereas the old
text of Article 146 has already been discussed for its potential
constitutional authority in the unification process," 8 the new Article
146 now reads:
This Basic Law, which is valid for the entire German nation following
achievement of the unity and freedom of Germany, shall cease to have
effect on the day on which a constitution adopted by a free decision of
the German people enters into force. 119

2. Relation to Unification
The Thirty-Sixth Amendment enacted the six changes required
20
by Article 4 of the Unification Treaty.1

3. Contribution to the Constitutional Model of German Unification
Germany can rightfully be said to have fulfilled its constitutional
amendment obligations under the treaties because it amended the

114.
115.
116.
117.

Id. art. 135a (F.R.G.).
Id. art. 143 (F.R.G.).
Id. art. 143 (F.R.G.).
Id. art. 143 (F.R.G.) (amended 1956; repealed

1968), available in

CONSTITUTIONS AND CONSTITUTIONAL TRENDS SINCE WORLD WAR II 327-28 (Arnold J.

Zurcher ed., 1955).
118.
See infra Part II.C.
119.
GG, supra note 18, art. 146 (F.R.G.).
120.
Unification Treaty, supra note 3, art. 4.
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Basic Law to fulfill its sole amendment obligation under the two
unification treaties.
The significance of this Act as an indicator of West Germany's
commitment to unification, however, may be diminished by two
factors. First, the changes required by Article 4 of the Unification
Treaty were necessarily effectuated prior to unification. Therefore,
the sole amendment obligation was fulfilled by the West German
legislature prior to unification and during a time of great political
support for German unification. 12 1 Had the unification treaties
imposed post-unificationamendment obligations, the united Germany
may have been less likely to honor the amendment obligations due to
the economic and social turmoil of the unification process.
Second, unification would not have occurred under Article 23 of
the Basic Law without the Thirty-Sixth Amendment. Had West
Germany failed to pass the Amendment, as detailed in Article 4 of the
Unification Treaty, unification would have proceeded, if at all, at a
slower pace under another unification method (probably through a
constitutional convention under Article 146 of the Basic Law).122 The
West German legislature's only option was to pass the Thirty-Sixth
Amendment and proceed with unification under Article 23 of the
Basic Law because West Germany desired to unify quickly without
123
dismantling the Basic Law during a constitutional convention.
Three conclusions may be reached that aid in the development of
a Constitutional Model of German Unification because Germany
fulfilled its only amendment obligation under the unification treaties
prior to formal- unification: (1) Germany opted for an expedient
unification route with some gradual features; (2) it was effective for
West and East Germany to impose pre-unification amendment
obligations, as opposed to post-unification amendment obligations;
and (3) a better indicator of Germany's commitment to completing
unification is to examine the Basic Law amendments that resulted
from the consequences (as opposed to the obligations) of the
unification process.
B. Thirty-Seventh Amendment of July 14, 1992124

1. Amendment Provision
The Thirty-Seventh Amendment to the Basic Law added a
second sentence to Article 87d(1). This article mandates that "[a]ir

121.
122.
123.
124.

See supranote
See supra note
See supra note
See supranote

5 and accompanying text.
119 and accompanying text.
34 and accompanying text.
83, 84 and accompanying text.
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transport shall be under direct federal administration;" the inserted
second sentence states that "[tlhe question of public or private status
shall be determined by federal legislation."'125 This
change allows the
26
transport.
air
privatize
to
Government
Federal
2. Relation to Unification
In accordance with Article 5 of the Unification Treaty, the united
German legislature formed a Joint Constitutional Commission to
investigate the necessity of further amending the Basic Law to
conform to the realities of unification. 127 Article 5 recommended
consideration of "the relationship between the Federation and the
Ldnder ....[the] restructuring [of] the Berlin/Brandenburg area ....
[the introduction of] state objectives into the Basic Law, and... the
question of applying Article 146 of the Basic Law and of holding a
referendum in this context."1 2 8 On October 28, 1993, the Joint
Constitutional Commission issued its Final Report. 29 The Final
Report recommended amendments to twenty-three Basic Law
articles. 130 The single change under the Thirty-Seventh Amendment
effectuated one of the Joint Constitutional Commission's
recommendations. 131
3. Contribution to the Constitutional Model of German Unification
In a technical sense, there is no question that the Thirty-Seventh
Amendment resulted from the mandate of Article 5 of the Unification
Treaty. In a practical sense, however, there are three reasons to
doubt the Amendment's actual relationship to unification. First, the
Joint Constitutional Commission issued its Final Report more than a
year after the Thirty-Seventh Amendment's passage. 132 Although
this fact alone does not destroy the possibility that the Amendment

125.

GG, supra note 18, art. 87d(1) (F.R.G.).

126.

Id.

127.

CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 1, at vii (Mar. 1994). The Joint Constitutional

Commission began its work on January 16, 1992. Id.
128.
Unification Treaty, supra note 3, art. 5.
129.
See JOINT CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT, October 28, 1993,
available in CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 1, at 13 (Mar. 1994) [hereinafter FINAL
REPORT].

130.
Id.
131.
Id.
In the end, nearly all twenty-three of the Joint Constitutional
Commission's recommendations were passed as Basic Law amendments under the
Thirty-Seventh, Thirty-Eighth, and Forty-Second Amendments. See infra notes 160,
272 and accompanying text.
132.
The Thirty-Seventh Amendment passed on July 14, 1992, and the Joint
Constitutional Commission issued its Final Report on October 28, 1993. See supra note
83 and accompanying text; FINAL REPORT, supra note 129, at 13.
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actually resulted from the Joint Constitutional Commission, it at
least casts some doubt on the Joint Constitutional Commission's role
in the passage of the Thirty-Seventh Amendment.
Second, authorizing the Federal Government to privatize air
transport does not fit into any of the categories proposed by Article 5
of the Unification Treaty for consideration by the Joint Constitutional
Commission. 133
Although Article 5 did not preclude the Joint
Constitutional Commission from considering other constitutional
needs arising from unification, the Joint Constitutional Commission
remained within the categories listed in Article 5 for most of its other
recommendations. 3 4 Concededly, privatization of air transport may
have been an actual necessity arising from unification (as was
privatization of the rail system under the Fortieth Amendment), 135
but there were external pressures to privatize air transport that were
136
not present for the privatization of the railway system.
Finally, the European Community (EC) pressured its Member
States to privatize air transport. 137 The EC sought to "integrate
national markets," with the added benefit of promoting
138
competition.
Therefore, in enabling the Federal Government to privatize air
transport, Germany may have been acting with mixed purposeseasing the pressures of unification and EC membership with a single
solution. Three conclusions contribute to the development of a
Constitutional Model of German Unification: (1) the Joint
Constitutional Commission may not have considered the pressures of
unification in isolation; (2) the Joint Constitutional Commission may
have had persuasive authority prior to the issuance of its Final
Report; and (3) Germany may be more willing to amend the Basic
Law to solve a problem of unification when the Amendment will also
comply with an EC demand.

133.
Unification Treaty, supra note 3, art. 5.
134. The eight recommendations that were passed under the Thirty.Eighth
Amendment also did not appear to fit into any of the categories proposed by Article 5
for consideration by the Joint Constitutional Commission. See Section 11.C.1. The
Thirty-Seventh and Thirty-Eighth Amendments, however, are similar in that they can
both be attributed to European pressures and unification pressures. See supra Part
II.B.3; infra Part III.C.3.
135.
See infra Part I1.E.
136.
Furthermore, privatization of the railway system did not occur pursuant to
the recommendations of the Joint Constitutional Commission. See Section 11.E.2.
137. See Jfrgen Basedow, Airline Deregulationin the European Community-Its
Background, Its Flaws, Its Consequences for E.C.-U.S. Relations, 13 J.L & Co!, 247,
253 (1994).
138.
Id. at 247-48.
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C. Thirty-Eighth Amendment of December 21, 1992139
1. Amendment Provisions
Eight changes occurred under the Thirty-Eighth Amendment
that not only provided Germany with the constitutional authority to
enter the Treaty on European Union, 140 but also updated the Basic
Law to refer to Germany's participation in the European Union. The
first change was the insertion of a new Article 23, which includes
seven paragraphs. Article 23(1) provides the constitutional authority
for Germany's participation in European integration, including its
participation in the European Union. 14 1 Article 23(2) establishes that
the Bundestag and the Ldnder "shall be involved in matters
concerning the European Union." 142 Article 23(3) describes the role of

139.
See supra note 85-87 and accompanying text.
140.
Unlike the Unification Treaty, no clear constitutional authority existed for
Germany to enter the Treaty on European Union. CURRIE, supra note 20, at 97.
Article 23 had been abrogated from the Basic Law under the Thirty-Sixth Amendment,
so the only possible authority for entering the European Union under the existing
Basic Law might be found under Article 24(1). Id. Article 24(1) provided for
Germany's participation in international organizations; however, the European Union
arguably did not qualify as an international organization under Article 24(1). GG,
supra note 18, art. 24(1) (F.R.G.); CURRIE, supra note 20, at 97.
Recognizing the difficulty in citing Article 24(1) as constitutional authority for
entering the Treaty on European Union, Germany's "approval of the [treaty] was
coupled with adoption of a new Article 23(1)." CURRIE, supra note 20, at 97. The new
Article 23(1) expressly authorized entry into the European Union by allowing Germany
to transfer some of its sovereign powers to the European Union. See infra note 141 and
accompanying text.
Although the new Article 23(1) seemed to provide Germany with the required
constitutional authority to enter the European Union, a constitutional challenge was
filed on the basis that the new Article 23(1) violated other provision of the Basic Law.
CURRIE, supra note 20, at 99. Specifically, the challengers argued that the new Article
23(1) violated Article 79(3) which suggests that massive changes (such as entry into the
European Union) could only be authorized by a vote of the people. Id. at 98; GG, supra
note 18, art. 79(3) (F.R.G.). The German Constitutional Court rejected the challenge in
1993, thereby allowing Germany's membership in the European Union under the
authority of the new Article 23(1). BVerfGE 89, 155 (155-57).
141.
"With a view to establishing a united Europe[,] the Federal Republic of
Germany shall participate in the development of the European Union, which is
committed to democratic, rule-of-law, social and federal principles as well as the
principle of subsidiarity, and ensures protection of basic rights comparable in
substance to that afforded by this Basic Law. To this end the Federation may transfer
sovereign powers by law with the consent of the Bundesrat. The establishment of the
European Union as well as amendments to its statutory foundations and comparable
regulations which amend or supplement the content of this Basic Law or make such
amendments or supplements possible shall be subject to the provisions of paragraph (2)
and (3) of Article 79." GG, supra note 18, art. 23(1) (F.R.G.) (italics added).
142.
GG, supranote 18, art. 23(2) (F.R.G.).
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the Bundestag in the European Union's legislative process. 14 3 Article
23(4) details the extent to which the Bundesrat must be consulted in
the Federal Government's decision-making regarding the European
Union. 44 Article 23(5) describes the extent of the Federation's
exclusive legislative- jurisdiction in matters pertaining to the
European Union. 145 Article 23(6) governs instances dealing with "the
exclusive legislative jurisdiction of the Ldinder."' 46 Finally, Article
23(7) requires the consent of the Bundesrat in all laws regarding the
14 7
details of Articles 23(4), 23(5), and 23(6).
The second change to the Basic Law under the Thirty-Eighth
Amendment was the addition of Article 24(la). Paragraph la
provides for the participation of the Iander in international
'Where the Lander have the right to exercise
organizations:
governmental powers and discharge governmental functions[,] they
may with the consent of the Federal Government transfer sovereign
powers to transfrontier institutions in neighboring regions."1 48
The third change to the Basic Law under the Thirty-Eighth
Amendment was the addition of the third sentence to Article 28(1).
The sentence reads: "In county and municipal elections persons who
are nationals of member states of the European Community, too, may
vote and shall be eligible for election in accordance with European
149
Community law."'
A fourth change under the Thirty-Eighth Amendment provided a
new Article 45. The previous Article 45 was repealed in August
1976.150 The new Article 45 mandates the Bundestag to "appoint a
Committee on European Union. It may empower the Committee to
exercise the Bundestag'srights in relation to the Federal Government
in accordance with Article 23."151
A new Article 52(3a) constituted the fifth change under the
Thirty-Eighth Amendment. This article authorizes the Bundesrat to
"form a Chamber for European Affairs whose decisions shall be
considered decisions of the Bundesrat ....,,152

The Thirty-Eighth Amendment's sixth change added a second
sentence to Article 88. The Federal Bank's "responsibilities and
powers may, within the framework of the European Union, be

143.

Id. art. 23(3) (F.R.G.).

144.
145.

Id. art. 23(4) (F.R.G.).

146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Id. art. 23(6) (F.R.G.) (italics added).
Id. art. 23(7) (F.R.G.).
GG, supranote 18, art. 24(la) (F.R.G.) (italics added).
Id. art. 28(1) (F.R.G.).
CONSITUTIONS, supra note 1, at 99.
GG, supranote 18, art. 45 (F.R.G.) (italics added).
Id. art. 52(3a) (F.R.G.).

Id. art. 23(5) (F.R.G.).
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transferred to the European Central Bank, which is independent and
15 3
whose primary aim is to safeguard price stability."'
The Thirty-Eighth Amendment's seventh change amended
Article 50 to refer to the European Union: 'The Ldnder shall
participate through the Bundesrat in the legislative process and
administration of the Federation in matters concerning the European
54
Union."1
Finally, the eighth change under the Thirty-Eighth Amendment
updated the second sentence of Article 115e(2) to refer to the proper
155
Basic Law articles.
2. Relation to Unification
In accordance with Article 5 of the Unification Treaty, the united
German legislature formed a Joint Constitutional Commission to
investigate the necessity of further amending the Basic Law to
conform to the realities of unification. 15 6 Article 5 recommended
consideration of "the relationship between the Federation and the
Ldnder..., [the] restructuring [of] the Berlin/Brandenburg area ....
[the introduction ofj state objectives into the Basic Law, and ... the
question of applying Article 146 of the Basic Law and of holding a
referendum in this context."157 On October 28, 1993, the Joint
Constitutional Commission issued its Final Report. 158 The Final
Report recommended amendments to twenty-three Basic Law
articles. 159 The eight changes under the Thirty-Eighth Amendment
enacted
eight
of the Joint
Constitutional
Commission's
160
recommendations.

153.
Id. art. 88 (F.R.G.) (italics added).
154.
Id. art. 50 (F.R.G.) (italics added).
155.
'The Joint Committee shall not be empowered to enact legislation pursuant
to paragraph (1), second sentence, of Article 23[;] paragraph (1) of Article 24[;] or
Article 29." GG, supra note 18, art. 115e(2) (F.R.G.). Article 115e(2) had previously
referred to just paragraph (1) of Article 24 and Article 29. Id. art. 115e(2) (F.R.G.)
(amended 1992).
The Joint Committee may, during times of defense, exercise the status of both the
Bundestag and the Bundesrat should it determine that the Bundestag is unable to
convene. Id. art. 115e(1) (F.R.G.).
156.
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 1, at vii (Mar. 1994). The Joint Constitutional
Commission began its work on January 16, 1992. Id.
157.
Unification Treaty, supra note 3, art. 5.
158.
159.

FINAL REPORT, supra note 129.
Id.

160.
Id. In the end, nearly all twenty-three of the Joint Constitutional
Commission's recommendations were passed as Basic Law amendments under the
Thirty-Seventh, Thirty-Eighth, and Forty-Second Amendments. See supra note 131
and accompanying text; infra note 272 and accompanying text.
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In addition, German unification acted to "accelerate the process
of European integration. '161 With German unification officially
accomplished, Germany turned its attention to participating in the
integration of Europe. 162 One scholar noted that it was "a symbolic
act of profound significance" that Germany chose to seek European
integration under an amended Article 23 because the prior Article 23
allowed Germany to accomplish German unification. 163 Therefore,
insofar as Germany made European integration a higher priority
after German unification, unification inspired an earlier passage of
the Thirty-Eighth Amendment's provisions than would have occurred
without unification.
3. Contribution to the Constitutional Model of German Unification
The analysis for the Thirty-Seventh Amendment's contribution
to the Constitutional Model of German Unification also applies to the
Thirty-Eighth Amendment. 164 In similar fashion, the Thirty-Eighth
Amendment passed prior to the issuance of the Joint Constitutional
Commission's Final Report. 165 Furthermore, the Joint Constitutional
Commission's recommendations under this Amendment do not
appear to fit into any of the categories proposed by Article 5 of the
Unification Treaty for consideration. 166 Finally, European pressures
to join the European Union, not just the pressures of unification,
67
could also explain the Amendment.'
The Thirty-Eighth Amendment, however, adds one feature to the
development of a Constitutional Model of German Unification: The
constitutional effects of German unification will become increasingly
difficult to identify as Germany also seeks to integrate with Europe.

161. Andreas Falke, An Unwelcome Enlargement? The European Community
and German Unification,in GERMAN UNIFICATION: PROCESS AND OUTCOMES 163, 169
(M. Donald Hancock & Helga A. Welsh eds., 1994).
162.
TIMOTHY GARTON ASH, INEUROPE's NAME: GERMANY AND THE DIVIDED
CONTINENT 384-88 (1993).
163.
Id. at 385.
164.
See supraPart III.B.3.

165.
The Thirty-Eighth Amendment passed on December 21, 1992, and the Joint
Constitutional Commission issued its Final Report on October 28, 1993. See supranote
85 and accompanying text; FINAL REPORT, supranote 129, at 13.
166.

Unification Treaty, supranote 3, art. 5.

167.

See supra notes 161-63 and accompanying text.
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68
D. Thirty-Ninth Amendment of June 28, 19931

1. Amendment Provisions
The Thirty-Ninth Amendment to the Basic Law, affecting three
separate articles, created stricter political asylum laws. The first
change repealed the second sentence of Article 16(2), which had
guaranteed that "[p]ersons persecuted on political grounds shall enjoy
1 69
the right of asylum."'
The second change, inserting a new Article 16a, reaffirms that
"[alnybody persecuted on political grounds has the right of
asylum."'170 Article 16a(2), however, denies the right of asylum to
anyone "who enters the country from a member state of the European
Communities or another third country where the application of the
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms is
assured.' 171 Furthermore, Article 16a(3) grants authority to the
Bundesrat to determine whether additional countries should be
presumed not to have politically persecuted anyone. 172 Article 16a(4)
describes the circumstances under which the court can suspend the
termination of a person's political protection in Germany. 173 Finally,
Article 16a(5) declares that "[p]aragraphs 1 to 4 do not conflict with
international agreements of member states of the European
Communities among themselves
and with [certain]
third
countries .... "174
The final change under the Thirty-Ninth Amendment updated
Article 18. Article 18 had directed the reader to consult Article 16 for
political asylum; now Article 18 refers the reader to Article 16a for
175
political asylum.
2. Relation to Unification
The Thirty-Ninth Amendment of June 28, 1993, represented a
radical change in Germany's political asylum law. Prior to the
Amendment, the Basic Law was the only constitution in the world to

168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

See supra note 88, 89 and accompanying text.
GG, supra note 18, art. 16(2) (F.R.G.) (repealed 1993).
Id. art. 16a(1) (F.R.G.).
Id. art. 16a(2) (F.R.G.).
Id. art. 16a(3) (F.R.G.).
Id. art. 16a(4) (F.R.G.).

174.

Id. art. 16a(5) (F.R.G.).

175.

Id. art. 18 (F.R.G.) (amended 1993); id. art. 18 (F.R.G.).
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grant refugees the individual right of political asylum. 17 6 In order to
understand the motivations behind this significant change, it is
necessary to describe the German refugee situation, including the
resulting social pressures following the fall of the Berlin Wall.
In the latter half of 1989 nearly two percent of East Germany's
population emigrated to West Germany. 177 Many observers believed
that West Germany could expect several million refugees from the
former Communist Bloc alone. 178 Furthermore, although only ten
percent of political asylum applicants were actually determined to
have been politically persecuted, Germany was obligated under
national and international laws to protect most of the denied
applicants. 179
Despite the inevitable political posturing and
exaggeration, Germany rightly expected an enormous refugee
burden. 18 0
This expectation resulted in political consequences.
In the
December 1990 elections, the controlling party (the Christian
Democrats) led by Chancellor Helmut Kohl, advocated tighter asylum
laws to ease the economic and social burdens of unification.' 8 ' After
Kohl's election victory, the opposing Social Democratic Party also
82
began to support the tighter asylum policy.1
By 1992 the hardships of unification created intense feelings of
xenophobia, especially among younger generations. 183 Some 2200
acts of ethnically motivated violence resulted in seventeen deaths in
1992 alone. 184 This xenophobic violence, however, inspired a massive
public response in support of foreigners.' 8 5 The widespread public
response led to greater prosecution of violent, ethnically motivated
offenders-so much so that these acts of violence began to dissipate
by the beginning of 1993.186 In the end, the tighter asylum policy
found the requisite legislative support to pass the Thirty-Ninth
Amendment in June 1993. Even more importantly, the Federal
Constitutional Court upheld the constitutionality of the asylum
187
amendment in a controversial 1996 decision.

176.
Klaus Grosch, Foreignersand Aliens, in MEET UNITED GER.iA,,,Y 230, 242
(Susan Stern ed., 1991).
177.

THE OXFORD COMPANION TO POLITICS OF THE WORLD 350 (Joel Krieger ed.,

1993).
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

Grosch, supra note 176, at 243.
Id.
See generally id. at 242-45.
JARAUSCH, supra note 2, at 192.
Id. at 207.
Id. at 209.
Id.
Id.
Id.
BVerfGE 94, 49 (52).
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The court's decision prompted a renewed outcry against the
asylum amendment. A variety of newspaper editorials detailed the
prevalent feelings. For example, Die Zeit wrote: "[m]uch may have
become easier-for us. What remains, however, is [the knowledge]
that we have abandoned part of a culture of rights."'1 8 8 Die
Tageszeitung echoed
these
sentiments:
'The
judges
have... finaliz[ed] the reversal of an important element of the [good]
old Federal Republic."'189 Finally, the FrankfurterRundschau argued
that the asylum amendment "turn[ed] a basic right into an empty
190
shell robbed of its fundamental content.'
3. Contribution to the Constitutional Model of German Unification
Two different unification concerns (with constitutional
implications) are raised by this discussion. First, with obvious
legislative support for the Amendment and obvious popular
disagreement, how was the issue of political asylum avoided in the
unification treaties? The massive immigration had begun in 1989
before any of the unification treaties were concluded. Furthermore,
the MESU Treaty had specifically dealt with social issues. 191 As the
only country in the world with a constitutional right to political
asylum, and with substantial immigration well underway, Germany's
avoidance of the political asylum issue in the unification treaties is
conspicuous.
Second, with such a bitterly yet unequally divided population,
how did the German legislature view clear popular support for the
asylum amendment? (Remember that a Basic Law amendment
requires the support of "two-thirds of the Members of the Bundestag
and two-thirds of the votes of the Bundesrat"under Article 79(2)).192
This discussion of the Thirty-Ninth Amendment contributes in
two ways to the development of the Constitutional Model of German
Unification: (1) the Amendment is an arguably negative
constitutional consequence of avoiding the political asylum issue in
the unification treaties; and (2) the Amendment is an arguably

188.
THE WEEK IN GERMANY, The Federal Constitutional Court Ruling on
Asylum (May 17, 1996), http://www.germany-info.orgtcontent/wk-dnarchive
wk_05_17_96.htm (quoting DIE ZEIT, May 15, 1996, in English) (copy on file with the
Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law).
189.
Id. (quoting DIE TAGESZEITUNG, May 15, 1996, in English).
190.
Id. (FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU, May 15, 1996, in English). One German
leader commented "that the article no longer reads like a basic right, but instead like a
provision preventing a basic right." SABINE MICHALOWSKI & LORNA WOODS, GERMAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THE PROTECTION OF CIVIL LIBERTIES 333 (1999) (quoting
Franflen, the president of the Federal Administrative Tribunal).
191.
MESU Treaty, supra note 7, arts. 17-25.
192.
GG, supra note 18, art. 79(2) (F.R.G.) (italics added). See supra notes 18-20
and accompanying text.

20011

CONSTITUTIONAL MODEL OF GERMAN UNIFICIATION

659

negative constitutional reaction to the social and political pressures of
unification.
E. FortiethAmendment of December 20, 1993193

1. Amendment Provisions
The Fortieth Amendment resulted in eight changes to the Basic
Law and dealt entirely with federal railroad issues. The first two
changes involved Article 73, which identified the areas of "exclusive
legislative jurisdiction" of the Federal Government. 194 First, the
words "federal railroads and" were removed from Article 73(6),
leaving only the words "air transport."1 95 Second, a new Article
73(6a) was created to address federal railroads separately. 195
The third change amended Article 74 (Areas of Concurrent
Jurisdiction),197 specifically Article 74(23). Instead of "non-federal
railroads, except mountain railroads," the article now refers to "nonfederal rail-bound systems, except mountain railways."198
The fourth change clarified the language of Article 80(2) without
making any substantive alterations to the Basic Law. Article 80(2)
requires the consent of the Bundesrat for all federal statutory orders
involving "rules and rates . . . of postal and telecommunications
services, rules governing rates for the use of federal railways[,] or
[rules] concerning the construction and operation of railways." 199
The fifth change under the Fortieth Amendment removed the
reference to "the federal railroads" from Article 87(1).200 Article 87
specifies the "areas of direct federal administration." 20 1 The sixth
change, however, again placed the federal railroads under direct
federal administration by creating a new Article 87e. Article 87e
contains five paragraphs, the first of which declares that "[flederal
rail transport shall be under direct federal administration." 20 2 Article
87e(2) describes when the Federal Government may administrate
non-federal rail transport. 20 3 Article 87e(3) organizes the federal
railways as "private enterprises." 20 4 Article 87e(4) dictates that the

193.

See supra note 90, 91 and accompanying text.

194.
195.

GG, supranote 18, art. 73 (F.R.G.).
Id. art. 73(6) (F.R.G.) (amended 1993); id. art. 73(6) (F.R.G.).

196.

Id. art. 73(6a) (F.R.G.).

197.

Id. art. 74 (F.R.G.).

198.

Id. art. 74(23) (F.R.G.) (amended 1993); id. art. 74(23) (F.R.G.).

199.

Id. art. 80(2) (F.R.G.).

200.

Id. art. 87(1) (F.R.G.) (amended 1993); id. art. 87(1) (F.R.G.).

201.
202.

Id. art. 87 (F.R.G.).
Id. art. 87e(1) (F.R.G.).
rd art. 87e(2) (F.R.G.).
Id. art. 87e(3) (F.R.G.).

203.

204.
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Federal Government must take into account the "transport
requirements of the whole community" when "improving and
maintaining the tracks of the federal railways" and when "providing
[certain] services. ' 205 Finally, Article 87e(5) summarizes when the
consent of the Bundesrat is required for matters involving the federal
206
railways.
The seventh change under the Fortieth Amendment inserted
Article 106a. Article 106a, a single paragraph, "concerns the tax
'207
allocation for local passenger transport services.
The final change under the Fortieth Amendment provided a new
Article 143a. The first paragraph of this provision mandates that
"[tlhe Federation has the exclusive right to legislate on all matters
resulting from the privatization of Federal Railways under its
administration. ' 20 8 Article 143a(2) allows the Federal Government to
execute all legislation that results from paragraph (1).209 Finally,
Article 143a(3) imposes a time limit (December 31, 1995) on the
Federal Government's responsibility for "local passenger rail services
of the hitherto Federal Railways ....",210
2. Relation to Unification
At the time of German unification, the infrastructure in eastern
Germany was "antiquated" and "crumbling."2 1 ' These descriptions
included "the chief transportation medium," the railroad.2 12
Immediately prior to unification one German leader estimated that
the total cost of upgrading East German transport systems would be
DM 200 billion. 2 13 By the end of 1995 DM 109 billion had already
been spent on eastern German infrastructure (DM 28 billion on the
railway system alone).

214

The economic pressure was acknowledged in a 1996 decision of
the Federal Constitutional Court which suggested that the Fortieth
Amendment was intended to expedite the improvement of the railway

205.
206.

Id. art. 87e(4) (F.R.G.).
Id. art. 87e(5) (F.R.G.).

207.

CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 1, at viii (Aug. 1994); GG,

supra note 18, art.

106a (F.R.G.).
208.

GG, supra note 18, art. 143a(1) (F.R.G.).

209.

Id. art. 143a(2) (F.R.G.).

210.
211.
212.
213.
214.

Id. art. 143a(3) (F.R.G.).
MERKL, supranote 63, at 255, 266.
Id. at 235.
Id. at 247.
Patricia J. Smith, The Illusory Economic Miracle: Assessing Eastern
Germany's Economic Transition, in AFTER THE WALL: EASTERN GERMANY SINCE 1989
109, 112 (Patricia J. Smith ed., 1998).
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in the former East Germany. 215 In its decision, which dealt with the
construction of a high-speed railway between Hannover and Berlin,
the Court recognized the Federal Government's authority to manage
the railways under the new Article 87e of the Basic Law.2 16

The

court determined that quickly improving the transport network in
eastern Germany was necessary, among other reasons, to "encourage
investment in the area."2 17 Therefore, the Court concluded, the
Federal Government had properly exercised its authority under
Article 87e. 218 The Court's decision indicates that the Federal
Government intended to use Article 87e as a means of swiftly
upgrade the eastern German railway system; an intent that is
consistent with the economic and infrastructure pressures arising
from unification.
3. Contribution to the Constitutional Model of German Unification
Both unification treaties addressed the issue of privatizing public
enterprises. 219 Article 25 of the Unification Treaty provided for
privatization through the Trust Agency, although it did not preclude
other methods of privatization. 220 The MESU Treaty's "Protocol on
Guidelines" did not suggest a method of privatization; rather, it
stated the goal that "[e]nterprises under direct or indirect state
ownership... will be organized competitively as quickly as possible
22 1
and transferred to private ownership as far as possible."
In light of these treaty provisions, what was the significance of a
Basic Law amendment that organized the federal railways into
private enterprises?
First, neither unification treaty precluded
privatization through Basic Law amendment. 22 2 The treaties did not
tie Germany to one privatization method. They allowed Germany to
mold its privatization method to the special circumstances
surrounding each public enterprise. In this case privatization
through Basic Law amendment was necessary because Article 87(1)
of the Basic Law placed the federal railways under direct federal
administration; 223 privatization required Basic Law amendment to

215.

Rainer Arnold, The German ConstitutionalCourt and Its Jurisprudencein

1996, 11 TUL. EURL & Civ. L.F. 85, 103-05 (1996) (discussing the case of BVerfGE 95. 1

(1)).
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.

Id. at 103-04.
Id.
Id.
See supra notes 62, 79-80 and accompanying text.
Unification Treaty, supranote 3, art. 25.
MESU Treaty, supra note 7, Protocol on Guidelines A.H.7.
See generally Unification Treaty, supra note 3; MESU Treaty, supra note 7.
GG, supra note 18, art. 87(1) (F.R.G.) (amended 1993).
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address the extent to which the Federal Government could continue
24
to administrate the railways after privatization.
Second, neither unification treaty precluded privatization of
former West German public enterprises. 225 The unification treaties
implicitly contemplated the possibility of amending Article 87 of the
Basic Law to meet the privatization goal of the MESU Treaty because
Article 87 of the Basic Law listed the areas of direct federal
administration in the former West Germany and because the
unification treaties did not limit privatization to former East German
226
public enterprises.
This discussion lends three elements to the development of a
Constitutional Model of German Unification: (1) the privatization
provisions of the two unification treaties were flexible enough to allow
the united Germany to privatize through Basic Law amendment; (2)
the privatization provisions of the two unification treaties were
flexible enough to provide for the privatization of former West
German public enterprises, even though privatization of former West
German public enterprises would require Basic Law amendments;
and (3) Germany's constitutional solution to the economic problem of
the eastern German railways may indicate a willingness to solve
22 7
other major unification problems with Basic Law amendments.
F. Forty-SecondAmendment of October 27, 1994
1. Amendment Provisions
The Forty-Second Amendment either
information in fourteen different Basic Law
Second Amendment added two sentences to
sentence in Article 3(2) reads: "The state
224.

changed or inserted
articles. 228 The FortyArticle 3. The second
supports the effective

Id. art. 87e (F.R.G.).

225.
See generally Unification Treaty, supra note 3; MESU Treaty, supra note 7.
Article 26 of the Unification Treaty transferred ownership of the former East German
railroad (the Deutsche Reichsbahn) to the united Germany. Unification Treaty, supra
note 3, art. 26.
226.
GG, supranote 18, art. 87 (F.R.G.) (amended 1993).
227.
The Forty-First Amendment of August 30, 1994, dealing with the
privatization of postal affairs and telecommunication, does not fall into the category of
Basic Law amendments designed to solve problems of German unification. Unlike the
privatization of the German railways, the Forty-First Amendment was a product of
European Community privatization pressures, not the direct product of German
unification pressures. Constantine J. Zepos, Note, Liberalizing the "Sacred Cows".
Telecommunicationsand Postal Services in the EC, 3 DUKE J. COMP. & INT. L. 203, 203
(1992). For postal affairs and telecommunications the European Community sought to
remove drastic irregularities between Member States by requiring private competition.

Id.
228.

See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
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realization of equality of women and men and works towards
abolishing present disadvantages."2 29
Furthermore, the second
sentence of Article 3(3) reads: "No one may be disadvantaged because
'2 30
of one's impairment.
The Forty-Second Amendment also added a new Article 20a to
the Basic Law entitled 'Protection of Natural Resources." 231 The
article asserts that "[t]he [S]tate, also in its responsibility for future
generations, protects the natural foundations of life in the framework
of the constitutional order, by legislation and, according to law and
232
justice, by executive and judiciary."
The Forty-Second Amendment inserted a third sentence into
Article 28: 'The concession of self-government encompasses also the
233
foundation of financial individual responsibility."
Two changes under the Forty-Second Amendment affected
Article 29. First, in Article 29(7), the Amendment increased from
10,000 to 50,000 the maximum number of inhabitants a Land may
have in order for its borders to be changed by federal law. 234 Second,
the Amendment inserted an eighth paragraph into Article 29, dealing
with the conditions under which Ldnder may enter into State
235
Treaties to alter their borders.
The Forty-Second Amendment made three changes to Basic Law
Article 72 (Concurrent Legislation of the Federation). 236 First, in
Article 72(1), it replaced the words "as long as and to the extent that
the Federation does not exercise its legislative powers" 2 37 with the
words "as long and insofar as the Federation has not made use of it
legislative competence by means of legislation." 238
Second, the

229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.

GG, supranote 18, art. 3(2) (F.R.G.).
Id. art. 3(3) (F.R.G.).
Id. art. 20a (F.R.G.).
Id.
Id. art. 28 (F.R.G.).
Id. art. 29(7) (F.R.G.).
See id. art. 29(8) (F.R.G.).

The Ldnder may regulate a restructuring of their territory or of parts of it,
deviating from the norms of paragraphs 2 and 7 by means of [a] State Treaty.
The affected communities and counties must be heard. The State Treaty
requires confirmation by referendum in each participating Land. If the State
Treaty concerns partial territories of the Ldnder, the confirmation may be
limited to referenda within these partial territories. The second half of
Sentence 5 does not apply In a referendum the majority of votes decides, if it
encompasses at least one-fourth of those who are entitled to vote in Bundestag
elections; details are regulated by a federal law. The State Treaty requires the
consent of the Bundestag.
Id. (italics added).

236.
237.
238.

GG, supranote 18, art. 72 (F.R.G.).
Id. art. 72(1) (F.R.G.) (amended 1994).
Id. art. 72(1) (F.R.G.).
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Amendment changed Article 72(2) to read: 'The Federation has the
right to legislate in this area, if and insofar as the establishment of
equivalent living conditions in the Federal territory or the
maintenance of legal and economic unity in the interest of the entire
state requires legislative regulation. '239 Finally, the Amendment
inserted a third paragraph into Article 72: "By means of federal law
it can be determined that a federal legislative regulation, in the sense
of paragraph 2, no longer exists [and] can be replaced by Land
'24 0
legislation.
Article 74 (Areas of Concurrent Legislation) received seven
changes under the Forty-Second Amendment. 241 The first two
changes abrogated Articles 74(1)(5) and 74(1)(8), dealing with the
transfer of German cultural property abroad and citizenship in the
Ldnder, respectively. 24 2 The third change added the parenthetical
"(without the right of opening contributions)" to Article 74(1)(18).243
The fourth change dealt with Article 74(1)(24), but nothing in the
language of Article 74(1)(24) changed. 24 4 The fifth and sixth changes
added Articles 74(1)(25) and 74(1)(26), dealing with state liability and
human biological matter, respectively. 24 5 Finally, the Amendment
inserted a short second paragraph into Article 74: "Laws according to
''246
Paragraph 1 No. 25 require the consent of the Bundesrat.
Four changes affecting Article 75 (Areas of Federal Framework
Legislation) occurred under the Forty-Second Amendment. 247 First,
the Amendment added a sixth area of federal framework legislation:
"Protection of cultural patrimony against export abroad. ''2
z 4 Second,

239.

Id. art. 72(2) (F.R.G.). Article 72(2) had previously read:

The Federation has the right to legislate where
1. a matter cannot be effectively regulated by the legislation of individual
Lander, or
2. regulation by a Land might prejudice the interests of other Lander or the
country as a whole, or
3. the maintenance of legal and economic unity, especially uniform living
conditions beyond the territory of any one Land, calls for federal
legislation.
Id. art. 72(2) (F.R.G.) (amended 1994).
240.
Id. art. 72(3) (F.R.G.) (italics added).
241.
Id. art. 74 (F.R.G.).
242.
Id. art. 74(1)(5) (F.R.G.) (amended 1994); id. art. 74(1)(8) (F.R.G.) (amended
1994).
243.
Id. art. 74(1)(18) (F.R.G).
244.
Id. art. 74(1)(24) (F.R.G.) (amended 1994); id. art. 74(1)(26) (F.R.G.).
245.
Id. art. 74(1)(25) (F.R.G.); id. art. 74(1)(26) (F.R.G.).
246.
Id. art. 74(2) (F.R.G.) (italics added).
247.
Id. art. 75 (F.R.G.).
248.
Id. art. 75(1)(6) (F.R.G.). Notice that this new area of federal framework
legislation was removed from the concurrent legislation of Article 74(1)(5) under the
Forty-Second Amendment. See supra note 242 and accompanying text.
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the Amendment added the statement "Article 72(3) applies
accordingly" to the end of Article 75(1).2 9 Third, the Amendment
added a second paragraph to Article 75: "Framework legislation may
contain only in exceptional cases detailed and directly applicable
regulations."250 Finally, the Amendment added a third paragraph to
Article 75: "If the Federation enacts framework legislation, then the
Lander are obligated to enact the required Land legislation within an
251
appropriate time determined by law."
The Forty-Second Amendment amended Articles 76(2) and 76(3),
dealing with legislative bills.252 These changes acted to balance the
power between the Bundestag and the Bundesrat.2- 3 Prior to the
changes, Article 76 had placed particular time limits on the
Bundesrat without placing corresponding time limits on the
Bundestag.25 4 The legislative houses have comparable periods within
which to respond to legislation submitted by the other house because
255
of the Forty-Second Amendment.
The Forty-Second Amendment added paragraph (2a) to Article
77: "Insofar as the consent of the Bundesrat is required for a law, if a
request according to paragraph 2 sentence 1 has not been made or if
the mediation procedure ended without a proposal for a change of the
law resolution the consent is to be given in due course."2 5 6
The Forty-Second Amendment inserted two paragraphs into
Article 80 (Delegated Legislation). 257 First, Article 80(3) reads: "The
Bundesrat can present to the Federal Government proposals for the
issuance of legal ordinances, which require its consent."'' 8 Second,
Article 80(4) reads: "If by means of a federal law [or on] the basis of
federal laws, the Land governments are empowered to issue legal
ordinances, the Ldnder are also authorized to regulate by law."2 9
The Forty-Second Amendment added a second sentence to the
second paragraph of Article 87 (Areas of Direct Federal
Administration). 260
That sentence reads:
"Social insurance
institutions whose territorial competence extends beyond one Land,
but not more than three Ldnder, shall be administered, in derogation

249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.

GG, supra note 18, art. 75(1) (F.R.G.).
Id. art. 75(2) (F.R.G.).
Id. art. 75(3) (F.R.G.) (italics added).
Id. art. 76(2) (F.R.G.); id. art. 76(3) (F.R.G.).
Id. art. 76(2) (F.R.G.); id.art. 76(3) (F.R.G.).
Id. art. 76(2) (F.R.G.) (amended 1994); id. art. 76(3) (F.RG.) (amended

1994).
255.
256.

Id. art. 76(2) (F.R.G.); id. art. 76(3) (F.R.G.).
Id. art. 77(2a) (F.R.G.) (italics added).

257.
258.
259.
260.

Id. art. 80 (F.R.G.).
Id. art. 80(3) (F.R.G.) italics added).
Id. art. 80(4) (F.R.G.) (italics added).
Id. art. 87 (F.R.G.).

666

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 34:633

of the first sentence, as direct corporations of public law, if the
261
supervisory Land is designated by the participating Ldnder."
The Forty-Second Amendment inserted a sentence into Article
93 (The Federal Constitutional Court, Jurisdiction). 262
Article
93(1)(2a) reads: "In case of disagreement, as to whether a law meets
the requirements of Article 72(2), [the Constitutional Court decides]
upon the request of the Bundesrat, a Land government, or the
263
representation of the people of a Land."
The Forty-Second Amendment inserted Article 118a, concerning
2 64
the modification of the territories of Berlin and Brandenburg.
Article 118a reads: '"The modification of the territory [comprising]
the Ldnder Berlin and Brandenburg can be effected, by agreement, in
derogation of the provisions of Article 29, with the participation of the
'265
voters of the two Ldnder.'
Finally, the Forty-Second Amendment inserted Article 125a
(Continued Application of Law as Federal Law Within the Sphere of
Concurrent Legislation and Framework Legislation). 266 Article 125a
reads:
Law, which was enacted as federal law, but which, because of
(1)

(2)

the change of Article 74(1) or Article 75(1) could no longer be
enacted, continues to be valid as federal law. It can be
replaced by Land law.
Law, which was enacted on the basis of Article 72(2) in the
form which was valid until November 15, 1994, continues to
be valid as federal law. By means of a federal law it can be
decided that it can be replaced by Land law. The same
applies to federal law, which was enacted before this point in
time, but which could no longer be enacted in accordance with
Article 75(2).267

2. Relation to Unification
In accordance with Article 5 of the Unification Treaty the united
German legislature formed a Joint Constitutional Commission to
investigate the necessity of further amending the Basic Law to
conform to the realities of unification.2 6 8 Article 5 recommended
consideration of "the relationship between the Federation and the

261.
Id. art. 87(2) (F.R.G.) (italics added).
262.
Id. art. 93 (F.R.G.).
263.
Id. art. 93(i)(2a) (F.R.G.) (italics added).
264.
Id. art. 118a (F.R.G.).
265.
Id. art. 118a (F.R.G.) (italics added).
266.
Id. art. 125a (F.R.G.).
267.
Id.
268.
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 1, at vii (Mar. 1994). The Joint Constitutional
Commission began its work on January 16, 1992. Id.
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Ldnder ....[the] restructuring [of] the Berlin/Brandenburg area ....
[the introduction of] state objectives into the Basic Law, and ... the
question of applying Article 146 of the Basic Law and of holding a
referendum in this context. '2 69

On October 28, 1993, the Joint

Constitutional Commission issued its Final Report. 27 0 The Final
Report recommended amendments to twenty-three Basic Law
articles. 271 Fourteen of those recommendations gained the necessary
votes to amend the Basic Law under the Forty-Second Amendment of
October 27, 1994.272
The changes affecting Articles 3 and 20a were recommended and
passed in state objective language; Article 5 of the Unification Treaty
had recommended consideration of whether state objectives should be
inserted into the Basic Law. 273 Furthermore, both gender equality
and the environment had been specifically addressed in the
unification treaties (Article 31(1) of the Unification Treaty for gender
equality; 274 Article 34(1) of the Unification Treaty and Article 16 of
27 5
the MESU Treaty for environment).
The changes affecting Articles 28, 72, 74, 75, 76, 77, 80, 87, 93,
and 125a all relate to the "relationship between the Federation and
the Ldnder."27 6 Article 5 of the Unification Treaty had recommended
consideration of whether Basic Law amendments should be made in
2 77
this regard.
The insertion of Article 118a related to the "restructuring [of] the
Berlin/Brandenburg area ...."278 Article 5 of the Unification Treaty
had recommended consideration of whether a Basic Law amendment
2 79
should be made in this regard.

269.
Unification Treaty, supranote 3, art. 5.
270.
FINAL REPORT, supranote 129.
271.
Id.
272.
Id. In addition, the Joint Constitutional Commission recommended all
eight of the Thirty-Eighth Amendments changes, as well as the only change under the
Thirty-Seventh Amendment. See supra notes 131, 160 and accompanying text The
Joint Constitutional Commission, however, did not issue its Final Report until after
both the Thirty-Seventh and Thirty-Eighth Amendments had passed. See supra notes
132, 165 and accompanying text.
As mentioned, the Joint Constitutional Commission made 23 recommendations for
Basic Law amendment. See CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 1, at ix (Mar. 1994). This
Note, in various places, seems to refer to 24 recommendations; however, one of the
recommendations (amending Article 28), occurred in two phases under the ThirtyEighth and Forty-Second Amendments. See supra notes 149. 233 and accompanying
text.
273.
Unification Treaty, supra note 3, art. 5.
274.
Id. art. 31(1).
275.
Id. art. 34(1); MESU Treaty, supra note 7, art. 16.
276.
Unification Treaty, supra note 3, art. 5.
277.
Id.
278.
Id.
279.
Id.
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Finally, the changes to Article 29 could be justified by two
provisions of Article 5 of the Unification Treaty: "the relationship
between the Federation and the Ldinder' and the "restructuring [of]
the Berlin/Brandenburg area."28 0 Article 29 details the methods of
restructuring Laender territories, as well as the extent of the Federal
28
Government's involvement in that effort. '
3. Contribution to the Constitutional Model of German Unification
This section will develop three themes that contribute to the
development of a Constitutional Model of German Unification: (1) the
limits of the Joint Constitutional Commission recommendations; (2)
the significance of the environmental state objective in Article 20a;
and (3) the significance of the gender equality state objective in
Article 3(2).
a. The Limits of the Joint Constitutional Recommendations
In three instances, the Forty-Second Amendment amended the
Basic Law to a greater extent than the Joint Constitutional
Commission had recommended.
First, the Joint Constitutional
Commission did not recommend a change to Article 74(1)(24).282
Second, the Joint Constitutional Commission did not recommend the
insertion of the words "Article 72(3) applies accordingly" at the end of
Article 75(1).283 Finally, the Joint Constitutional Commission did not
2 84
recommend the insertion of Article 125a(2).
In two instances, however, the Basic Law has never been
amended to the extent recommended by the Joint Constitutional
Commission.
First, the Joint Constitutional Commission
recommended the insertion of an Article 20b: 'The State respects the
identity of ethnic, cultural and linguistic minorities. '2 85 Second, the
Joint Constitutional Commission recommended more substantial
changes to Article 75 than were actually passed under the Forty286
Second Amendment.

280.
281.

Id.
GG, supranote 18, art. 29 (F.R.G.).

282.
FINAL REPORT, supra note 129. As discussed, the language of Article
74(1)(24) was not changed under the Forty-Second Amendment; however, it was still
officially listed as an amendment. See supra note 244 and accompanying text.
283.
See generally FINAL REPORT, supra note 129.
284.
Id.
285.
Id. at 15. This recommendation is phrased in state objective language. For
a discussion regarding the significance of state objective language in the Basic Law, see
infra notes 301-03 and accompanying text.
286.
FINAL REPORT, supra note 129, at 21. Primarily, the Joint Constitutional
Commission recommended two additional changes to the areas of federal framework
legislation. First, it sought to limit the definition of "general principles governing
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b. Environment
The insertion of an environmental state objective under the
Forty-Second Amendment had not been the first attempt at adding a
Basic Law provision concerning the environment. 28 7 Three preunification attempts had failed. 288 First, in 1973-74 the social-liberal
government proposed an "environmental fundamental right," which
was not adopted because such a fundamental right lacked "individual
enforceability. 289 Second, in the early 1980s an expert commission
recommended the insertion of an "environmental statement of public
policy" into the Basic Law. 290 The Bundestag voted down the
recommendation, with opponents noting that an environmental
amendment to the Basic Law was unnecessary because the national
legislature could already address environmental issues through
legislation. 291 Finally, between 1987 and 1990 a parliamentary group
introduced a bill that would have added a Basic Law "environmental
statement of public policy. '292 Despite widespread support for the
concept, negotiations broke down amidst disagreement over the
2 93
content of the statement.
This contentious history raises the following question: Why did
unification finally produce an environmental state objective in Article
20a of the Basic Law? Two commentators remarked that "there
seem[ed] to be a consensus and a willingness to act," considering the
"disastrous environmental conditions in the territory of the former
[East Germany]." 294 In fact in 1990 alone eastern Germany emitted
eleven times more sulfur dioxide, and eight times more dust, than
western Germany. 295 Furthermore, seventy-eight percent of eastern
Germany's rivers and lakes were either totally unfit for drinking
water or only fit for drinking water with the use of "extremely
296
complex technology."

higher education" in Article 75(1)(la). Id. Second, it sought to add an entirely new
area of federal framework legislation under Article 75(1)(2): 'the general legal
relations of the press." Id.
287.
Ernst Brandl & Hartwin Bungert. Constitutional Entrenchment of
Environmental Protection: A ComparativeAnalysis of Experiences Abroad, 16 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 24-30 (1992).
288. Id.
289. Id. at 24.
290. Id. at 26.
291. Id.
292. Id. at 27.
293. Id. at 29.
294. Id. at 44.
295. Jan C. Bongaerts, Towards a Cleaner Germany:
Post-Unification
Environmental Policy, in MEET UNITED GERMANY 161, 167-68 (Susan Stern ed., 1991).
296. Id. at 169.
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The European Union also pressured Germany to improve the
environmental situation in eastern Germany. 29 7 Eastern German air
pollution, for example, quadrupled the European Community
average, with eastern Germany emitting more sulfur dioxide than
any other European country. 298 The Commission 299 allowed eastern
Germany to deviate from European Community environmental
standards until 1996 (for water, air, and ground pollution), but this
unrealistic timeframe only served to heighten the need for Germany
30 0
to act quickly.
A final question presents itself as a result of this discussion:
How does a state objective amendment to the Basic Law help to solve
the environmental problem?
The answer lies in the German
conception of the Basic Law. One scholar notes that Germans "insist
on enforcing the letter, not merely the spirit, of the Basic Law. ' 30 1
Furthermore, "there is less margin in Germany for tolerance of
uncertainty or ambiguity in constitutional matters. ' 30 2 Therefore, an
environmental state objective in the Basic Law "would produce actual
effects."

303

c. Gender Equality
The first sentence of Basic Law Article 3(2) states that "[m]en
and women shall have equal rights. '30 4
The Forty-Second
Amendment added a state objective to Article 3(2): '"The state
supports the effective realization of equality of women and men and
works towards abolishing present disadvantages. '30 5
One
commentator argues that the amended Article 3(2) "contains a
mandate to the state to guarantee the equal placement of women...
in society. ' 30 6 Therefore, the amended Article 3(2) adopts "a factual

equality

approach,"

requiring

"the

elimination

of

sex-based

297.
Falke, supra note 161, at 180.
298.
Id.
299.
The Commission is a European Union institution, composed of twenty
Commissioners, charged with four principle functions: (1) to ensure that the treaties
governing the European Union are properly applied, (2) to make recommendations
concerning the European Union treaties, (3) to participate in the European legislative
process, and (4) to perform other duties as assigned by the Council. TOM KENNEDY,
LEARNING EUROPEAN LAW: A PRIMER AND VADE-MECUM 64, 66-67 (1998).
300.
Falke, supra note 161, at 180.
301.
Andries, supra note 9, at 33.

302.

Id. at 34 (quoting Donald P. Kommers).

303.
Brandl & Bungert, supranote 287, at 30.
304.
GG, supra note 18, art. 3(2) (F.R.G.).
305.
Id.
306.
Monica Bhattacharyya, From Nondifferentiation to Factual Equality:
Gender Equality Jurisprudence Under the German Basic Law, 21 BROOK. J. INT'L L.
915, 936 (1996) (quoting a representative of the Joint Constitutional Commission).
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discriminatory laws [and] the activist reform of discriminatory social
307
practices."
Despite the stated intentions of the amended Article 3(2),

however, fundamental inconsistencies exist between the amended
Article 3(2) and Article 12a. Article 12a governs compulsory military
service, and it provides two examples of sex-based discrimination in
derogation of the amended Article 3(2). First, under Article 12a(l),
only "men who have attained the age of eighteen years may be
required to serve in the Armed Forces, in the Federal Border Guard,
or in a civil defen[s]e organization." 30 8 Under Article 12a(l), women
who have reached the age of eighteen cannot be required to serve,
except under the limited circumstances and in the limited roles
30 9
prescribed by Article 12a(4).
The second example of sex-based discrimination in Article 12a
concerns the limited role of women in the military under Article
12a(4), which was recently amended by the Forty-Eighth Amendment
of December 19, 2000.310 Prior to the Forty-Eighth Amendment
women could "on no account be assigned to military service involving
armed combat" under Article 12a(4). 311 Both before and since the
Forty-Eighth Amendment, women may only be compelled to serve
during a "state of defen[s]e" in which certain health system needs
"cannot be met on a voluntary basis." Even then, women can only be
compelled to serve in "the civilian health system or [to] the stationary

military

hospital

organization." 312

Since

the

Forty-Eighth

Amendment, women may not be required to serve in armed combat,
3 13
although they may now volunteer for armed combat.

307.
Id. at 916.
308.
GG,supranote 18, art. 12a(1) (F.R.G.).
309.
See infra note 312 and accompanying text.
310.
See supra note 107 and accompanying text. The Forty-Eighth Amendment
changed the second sentence of Article 12a(4) to read. "They [women] may on no
account be required to serve in armed combat." GG, supra note 18. art. 12a(4) (F.R.G.).
The Forty-Eighth Amendment is not discussed separately because its relation to
unification is tenuous at best. At best, the Forty.Eighth Amendment is a direct result
of the Thirty-Eighth and Forty-Second Amendments rather than a direct result of
unification. Therefore, at best the amendment is a direct result of unification.
311.
GG, supranote 18, art. 12a(4) (F.R.G.) (amended 2000).
312. Id.; id. art. 12a(4) (F.R.G.).
313. GG, supra note 18, art. 12a(4) (F.R.G.). On January 11, 2000, the
European Court of Justice (ECJ) issued a judgment on the gender equality issue in
Kreil v. Germany. Case 285198, Kreil v. Germany, Court of Justice of the European
Communities (Jan. 11, 2000) (summary available in English at http://europa.eu.int/cj
en/cp/aff/cp0001en.htm. The Court held that German legislation prohibiting women
from holding any position in the military requiring the use of firearms is "contrary to
the Community principle of equal treatment for men and women." Press Release No.
1/2000, Kreil v. Germany, Court of Justice of the European Communities (Jan. 11,
2000) (available in English at http/europa.eu.int/cjen/cpfaff/cpOOOlen.htm).
The
Court acknowledged that some exceptions might apply for "special combat units." Id.
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The inconsistencies between the amended Article 3(2) and
Article 12a violate both aspects of "factual equality. 314 Article 12a is
a "sex-based discriminatory law"3 15 because it imposes compulsory
armed military service on only one gender. Furthermore, Article 12a
promotes a "discriminatory social practice 316 because it only allows
the military to place women in the healthcare field (a traditional
social role for women during times 'of war) unless the women
volunteer for armed combat under the recently amended Article
12a(4). Therefore, so long as Articles 3(2) and 12a remain in their
present forms, the sincerity of factual gender equality is questionable.
The Forty-Second Amendment contributes five features to the
development of a Constitutional Model of German Unification: (1)
Germany fulfilled the constitutional amendment recommendations
under Article 5 of the Unification Treaty; (2) the Joint Constitutional
Commission possessed actual persuasive authority, not binding
authority, in shaping the Basic Law to conform to the necessities of
unification; (3) unification forced the adoption of long-contested
amendments, such as the environmental state objective; (4) the
nature of the Basic Law ensures that the state objective amendments
will have actual weight; and (5) the Basic Law inconsistencies
regarding gender equality diminish the positive effect of fulfilling the
constitutional recommendations under Article 5 of the Unification
Treaty.
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONAL MODEL OF GERMAN UNIFICATION
The Constitutional Model of German Unification includes three
elements: (1) the constitutional characteristics of unification; (2)
constitutional recommendations for future unifying States; and (3)
predictions of future Basic Law amendments relating to unification.

On December

19, 2000, the German legislature passed the Forty-Eighth

Amendment, authorizing women to serve in armed military combat. See supra note
107 and accompanying text. On January 2, 2001, 244 women reported for duty in the
German armed forces. First Women Allowed into Combat Forces, CNN, January 2,
2001, http://www.cnn.com/ WORLD/europelgermany/01/02/women.army/index.
The Forty-Eighth Amendment exemplifies the extent of Germany's willingness to
participate in European integration, a process that was first introduced into the Basic
Law under the Thirty-Eighth Amendment. See supra notes 161-63 and accompanying
text. Furthermore, the Forty-Eighth Amendment directly addresses factual gender
equality, a concept that was introduced into the Basic Law under the Forty-Second
Amendment. See supra note 307 and accompanying text.
314.
Bhattacharyya, supranote 306, at 916.
315.
Id.
316.
Id.
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A. The ConstitutionalCharacteristicsof German Unification
1. Expedient and Gradual Unification
Article 23 of the Basic Law allowed East Germany to accede to
the West German Basic Law without the time-consuming process of a
3
constitutional convention (as Article 146 would have required). "
This unification method, as opposed to other proposed methods,
allowed formal unification to occur swiftly while great popular
support existed for the unification goal.3 18 This ensured two things:
(1) unification would definitely occur-it would not be abandoned
once the hardships of a slower unification method became apparent;
and (2) unification would not be hampered by the remnants of a
contractual relationship or confederation.
Expedient unification, however, included two gradual
components. First, multiple treaties effectuated German unification.
Therefore, the MESU Treaty allowed West and East Germany to
experience monetary, economic, and social union before finalizing
political union in the Unification Treaty. 319 Second, the unification
treaties instituted transition periods for discrepancies between laws
and application of laws. 320

Most importantly, the Thirty-Sixth

Amendment inserted a transition period directly into Article 143 of
3 21
the Basic Law.
2. Fulfillment of the Constitutional Obligations of Unification
Germany fulfilled all of its Basic Law amendment obligations
under the unification treaties. Article 4 of the Unification Treaty
322
detailed the only Basic Law amendments required by unification,
and Germany passed these changes prior to unification under the
Thirty-Sixth Amendment of September 23, 1990.323
Germany positioned itself for success in this regard in two ways.
First, the unification treaties did not require any post-unification
Basic Law amendments. 3 24 This allowed unification to proceed under
Article 23 of the Basic Law only if West Germany successfully passed
the required constitutional changes.
Given the overwhelming

317.

See supraPart 1.C.

318.
319.

Id.
See supraPart II.D.

320.
321.
322.
323.
324.

See supranotes 69-71 and accompanying text.
GG, supranote 18, art. 143 (F.R.G.).
Unification Treaty, supra note 3, art. 4.
See supraPart UI.A.1.
See generally Unification Treaty, supra note 3; MESU Treaty, supra note 7.
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support for unification, there was little danger of the required
constitutional changes not passing into the Basic Law. Furthermore,
by not requiring post-unification amendments Germany protected
itself from later failing to perform its constitutional unification
obligations had the hardships of the unification process ever
prevented later constitutional amendments from passing.
Second, the unification treaties provided constitutional flexibility
in Germany's approach to the inevitable problems arising from
unification. Just as the unification treaties did not require postunification Basic Law amendments, they also did not preclude postunification Basic Law amendments to address problems relating to
unification.
3. Fulfillment of the Constitutional Recommendations of Unification
Germany also fulfilled the constitutional recommendations of the
unification treaties. Article 5 of the Unification Treaty contained the
32 5
only recommendations for post-unification Basic Law amendments.
Under the authority of Article 5 the deliberations of the Joint
Constitutional Commission resulted in more than twenty Basic Law
changes under the Thirty-Seventh, Thirty-Eighth, and Forty-Second
Amendments. 326 Although the Thirty-Seventh and Thirty-Eighth
Amendments might have passed without the Joint Constitutional
Commission, the Forty-Second Amendment is entirely attributable to
the work of that body.
4. Basic Law Internal Inconsistency
Although it is a positive feature of the unification process that
the Joint Constitutional Commission possessed actual persuasive
authority in recommending amendments to the Basic Law under
Article 5 of the Unification Treaty, one of the Joint Constitutional
Commission's recommendations resulted in a Basic Law internal
inconsistency. The Forty-Second Amendment's state objective of
gender equality in Article 3(2) is inconsistent with the gender
inequalities in Article 12a.3 27 This inconsistency remains even after
the passage of the Forty-Eighth Amendment on December 19,
2000.328

325.
326.
327.
328.

Unification Treaty, supra note 3, art. 5.
See supra Parts III.B.I., III.C.i., & III.F.1.
GG, supra note 18, art. 3(2) (F.R.G.); id. art. 12a (F.R.G.).
See supra notes 308-16 and accompanying text.
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5. Unification as an Impetus for Long-Contested Amendments
The circumstances of unification also resulted in one Basic Law
change that had been long-contested: the environmental statement of
public policy.
Although the environmental "state objective" is
significant because it resulted from the deliberations of the Joint
Constitutional Commission, it is also significant because it passed
despite a long, pre-unification history of political disagreement.
German unification, particularly the horrific environmental
conditions in eastern Germany, consolidated support for this type of
public policy statement. This indicates one further point about
unification:
whereas unification could have rendered political
cooperation ineffective, it forced political cooperation with respect to
the environmental "state objective."
6. Constitutional Reactions to Unification Consequences
Despite the remarkable comprehensiveness of the unification
treaties, the drafters necessarily reserved some issues for later
resolution. Germany passed two Basic Law amendments in response
to consequences of unification: the Thirty-Ninth Amendment of June
28, 1993,329 and the Fortieth Amendment of December 20, 1993.330
The Thirty-Ninth Amendment created stricter political asylum
requirements in Germany. It is an arguably negative constitutional
reaction to the social and political consequences of German
unification in two ways. First, mass immigration, as a foreseeable
consequence of unification, should have been addressed in the
unification treaties.
Second, Germany passed the Amendment
despite a lack of clear popular support for the Amendment.
The Fortieth Amendment, on the other hand, was a positive
constitutional reaction to the economic consequences of unification.
Germany intended the privatization of the railway system through
Basic Law amendment to provide the Federal Government with a
quick method for rebuilding the dilapidated eastern German
railways. 331
This included the added benefit of encouraging
investment in eastern Germany. 332
Therefore, Germany
demonstrated its commitment to unification by taking serious
constitutional steps to solve the economic problems of the eastern
German railway system.

329.
330.
331.
332.

See supraPart Im.D.
See supraPart II.E.
See supranotes 215-18 and accompanying text.
See supranote 217 and accompanying text.
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7. European Integration as a Constitutional Factor in Unification
A minor but persistent point in the development of this
Constitutional Model of German Unification is the role of European
integration. European integration and German unification have
affected one another. German unification, on the one hand, sped up
the process of European integration. 333 European integration, on the
other hand, influenced the passage of the Thirty-Seventh and ThirtyEighth Amendments to the Basic Law. 33 4 This discussion highlights
a further point: Germany will be more willing to amend the Basic
Law when the goals of German unification and European integration
coincide.
B. ConstitutionalRecommendations for Future Unifying States
Although no two unification scenarios will ever be identical, the
following general unification recommendations will still apply in
many instances.
If unification is popularly desired and practically feasible,
effectuate total unification-monetary, economic, social, and
political
unification-through
constitutionally
valid
procedures as quickly as the situation allows. Make use of
gradual means, such as multiple treaties and transition
periods, to ease the unification, so long as doing so would not
prevent total unification.
Do not impose post-unification amendment obligations unless
there is a safeguard against future non-compliance. In other
words, impose only pre-unification amendment obligations
unless total unification could not occur without postunification amendment obligations and guarantees of future
compliance. As an alternative to post-unification amendment
obligations, provide detailed recommendations for future
constitutional amendments and a mechanism through which
the recommendations will be seriously considered.
Fulfill constitutional amendment obligations.
For preunification amendment obligations, ensure that unification
cannot proceed until the required constitutional amendments
are passed. Although post-unification amendment obligations
are not recommended, do not ignore them if they are included
in the unification agreement.
Fulfill post-unification
constitutional obligations if they are still in the interest of the
unified State. Otherwise, alter the unification agreement
through constitutional means and with popular participation.

333.
334.

See supra notes 161-63 and accompanying text.
See supra Parts III.B.3, III.C.3.
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* Do not pass recommended constitutional amendments or
other constitutional amendments intended to solve a
unification problem, unless: (1) all constitutional provisions
will be facially and substantively consistent after the
amendment is passed; (2) the amendment will achieve actual,
measurable results; and (3) the amendment would not
eliminate a relied-upon protection of an individual right.
C. Predictionsof FutureBasic Law UnificationAmendments

1. General Predictions
* Germany will pass additional amendments that address
difficulties arising from German unification; however, these
amendments will become increasingly difficult to identify as
resulting solely from unification. The problems encountered
as a result of unification will become less discernible from
other problems encountered by the united Germany.
Consequently, the most influential Basic Law amendments
have already passed with respect to the Constitutional Model
of German Unification.
* Germany will pass more state objective amendments to the
Basic Law. The gender equality and environmental state
objectives, although resulting from the recommendations of
the Joint Constitutional Commission, will inspire more state
objective amendments. Germany, however, vill only enact
further state objective amendments after it can evaluate the
effectiveness of the first two state objectives. A possible topic
for future state objectives is protection for ethnic, cultural,
33 5
and linguistic minorities.
* European integration will continue to influence the Basic
Law. Pressure from the European Union, on the one hand,
will result in amendments in specific areas. Germany, on the
other hand, will eventually be called upon to participate in a
European organization that exceeds the authority of the new
Article 23. Germany, as one of the more ardent supporters of
European integration, will revise the Basic Law to allow
participation in that future European organization (as it did
336
in the Thirty-Eighth Amendment).

335.

This is the one state objective recommendation of the Joint Constitutional

Commission that the German legislature never adopted.
129, at 15.
336.
See supra Part III.C.

FINAL REPORT, supra note
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2. Specific Predictions
Germany will reinstate a less restricted form of the individual
right to political asylum. The Thirty-Ninth Amendment constituted
the low point in the unification process, contributing no positive
characteristics to the Constitutional Model of German Unification.
The importance of reinvigorating the right to political asylum,
however, will diminish as the European Union continues to expand.
First, the European Union could one day include many of the eastern
European States from which Germany sought to protect itself with
the Thirty-Ninth Amendment. Second, the European Union could
assume the role of protecting political asylum seekers, thereby
removing the need for individual Member States to possess such
laws. 337 In light of these possibilities, reinstating an absolute right to
political asylum may only serve a face-saving role for Germany.
Germany will resolve the gender equality inconsistencies
between Articles 3(2) and 12a of the Basic Law. This might have
been more likely and less difficult, however, prior to the passage of
the Forty-Eighth Amendment of December 19, 2000.338

V. CONCLUSION

It has been more than ten and a half years since German
unification occurred on October 3, 1990. For Germany, where all
critical state principles are included in the Basic Law, there is no
better way to evaluate the overall success of unification than to
evaluate the constitutional effects of unification. Of thirteen Basic
Law amendments since 1990 six amendments directly resulted from
340
unification. 339 Of those six amendments, only one full amendment
341
and one change in another amendment
provided negative
components to the Constitutional Model of German Unification.
Considering the unprecedented nature of German unification, the
Constitutional Model of German Unification illustrates Germany's
undisputed good faith in effectuating the unification, as well as the
overall success of the unification process.

337.
fulfill this
progresses.
338.
339.

ASH, supra note 162, at 400-01. The European Union was reluctant to
role after unification; however, the possibility still exists as integration
Id.
See supranotes 310-13 and accompanying text.
This refers to the Thirty-Sixth, Thirty-Seventh, Thirty-Eighth, Thirty-

Ninth, Fortieth, and Forty-Second Amendments.

340.
This refers to the Thirty-Ninth Amendment.
341.
This refers to the inconsistencies between Articles 3(2) and 12a of the Basic
Law under the Forty-Second Amendment.
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Moreover, because Germany's good faith resulted in a successful
unification, future unifications between other unifying States will not
be unprecedented.
Future unifying States can be guided by
Germany's unification experience through understanding, and
adapting to, the positive and negative constitutional effects of
German unification.
Therefore, German unification not only
accomplished a long-desired domestic goal, but it also provided an
enduring model for all future international unifications.
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